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What War Tactic Did the U s Use Again to Cut Down on Heavy Ship Losses

Written By Wednesday, May 18, 2022 Add Comment Edit

Japanese freighter Nittsu Maru sinks subsequently beingness torpedoed past USSWahoo on 21 March 1943.

Allied submarines were used extensively during the Pacific War and were a key contributor to the defeat of the Empire of Japan.

During the war, submarines of the Us Navy were responsible for 55% of Japan's merchant marine losses; other Allied navies added to the toll.[1] The war against aircraft was the single most decisive factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy. Allied submarines also sank a big number of Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troop transports, killing many thousands of Japanese soldiers and hampering the deployment of IJA reinforcements during the battles on the Pacific islands.

They also conducted reconnaissance patrols, landed special forces and guerrilla troops and performed search and rescue tasks.[2] The majority of the submarines involved were from the U.S. Navy, with the British Royal Navy committing the second largest number of boats and the Royal Netherlands Navy contributing smaller numbers of boats.

The Centrolineal submarine campaign is i of the to the lowest degree-publicized feats in armed services history,[1] in big part considering of the efforts of Allied governments to ensure their own submarines' actions were not reported in the media. The U.S. Navy adopted an official policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, and it appears the policy was executed without the noesis or prior consent of the government.[3] The London Naval Treaty, to which the U.South. was signatory,[4] required submarines to abide by prize rules (commonly known as "cruiser rules"). It did not prohibit arming merchantmen,[5] but arming them, or having them report contact with submarines (or raiders), made them de facto naval auxiliaries and removed the protection of the cruiser rules.[six] This made restrictions on submarines effectively moot.[5] A major reason why the U.S. submarine campaign is very obscure and unknown in the United states of america is because the defective Marking 14 and Marker 15 torpedoes were mass produced even though there was no acceptable testing during evolution and the faulty engineering science of the torpedoes led to iv major faults that led to just a twenty% success rate from Dec 1941 to tardily 1943. For ii years U.S. submarines struggled to sink any Japanese warships or merchant ships. For example, during the 1941-42 Philippines campaign the United States Navy'due south Asiatic Armada's 23 mod state-of-the-art submarines failed to sink a single Japanese warship fifty-fifty when submarines scored directly hits because the torpedoes all failed to explode for myriad reasons.[7] [8]

Groundwork [edit]

The U.South. had the largest and most powerful submarine force of all the Allied countries in the Pacific at the outbreak of war.[ commendation needed ] Pre-war U.S. Navy doctrine—like that of all major navies—specified that the main role of submarines was to support the surface fleet by conducting reconnaissance and attacking large enemy warships. Merchant ships were regarded as secondary targets, and the circumstances in which they could be attacked were profoundly express by prize rules set up out in the London Naval Treaty, to which the U.South. was a signatory. The U.S. Navy built large submarines which boasted long range, a relatively fast cruising speed and a heavy armament of torpedoes. United States submarines were better suited for long patrols in the tropics than those of the other major powers due to amenities such as air conditioning (which German U-boats, for example, lacked) and fresh water distillation units.[ commendation needed ] The submarines' commanders and crewmen were considered aristocracy and enjoyed a strong esprit de corps.[9] On 7 December 1941, the USN had 55 armada- and 18 medium-sized submarines (South-boats) in the Pacific, 38 submarines elsewhere, and 73 under structure.[x] (By war's end, the U.S. had completed 228 submarines.)[11]

While Britain stationed a force of submarines in the Far East prior to the outbreak of war, no boats were bachelor in December 1941. The British had fifteen modern submarines in the Far Due east in September 1939. These submarines formed part of the China Station and were organised into the 4th Flotilla. Although the number of British submarines in the Far East increased in early 1940 when the eighth Flotilla arrived at Ceylon, both flotillas and all their submarines were withdrawn in mid-1940 to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet.[12]

The netherlands likewise maintained a submarine force in the Far East in club to protect the Netherlands E Indies (NEI). In December 1941, this strength comprised fifteen boats based at Surabaya, most of which were obsolete.[13] [xiv]

Strategic implications [edit]

Throughout the war, Nihon was dependent on ocean transport to provide adequate resources, including nutrient, to the domicile islands and supply its military machine at garrisons across the Pacific. Before the war, Japan estimated the nation required five,900,000 long tons (6,000,000 t) of shipping to maintain the domestic economy and military machine during a major war. At the time of the assault on Pearl Harbor Japan'due south shipping capacity was much greater than that, totaling 7,600,000 long tons (7,700,000 t) of shipping: the Japanese merchant fleet was capable of 6,400,000 long tons (six,500,000 t), and smaller craft were capable of an additional i,200,000 long tons (1,200,000 t).[15]

At the kickoff of the war, the U.Southward. submarine fleet was ineffective, for multiple reasons:[16]

  • A high proportion of the submarines deployed against the Japanese were obsolete.
  • U.S. boats were hampered by defects in their main weapon, the Mark fourteen torpedo.
  • Poor preparation led to an excessive reliance on sonar.
  • Skippers were insufficiently aggressive,[17] and they exhibited an undue fearfulness of destroyers' sonar and aircraft.[18]
  • Poor dispositions – the armada were scattered on close surveillance of Japan's major bases.[nineteen]
  • Command was divided, which kept submarines out of one of the best hunting areas, the Luzon Strait, for fearfulness of friendly fire.[20]

Despite an awareness that shipping was vital, the Japanese military machine seriously underestimated the (eventual) threat from Allied submarines. This overconfidence was reinforced past the ineffectiveness of Allied submarines in the early part of the state of war.[21] Anti-submarine warfare was accorded a depression priority and few warships and shipping were allocated to protecting merchant shipping.[22] Japanese destroyers formed the majority of convoy protection; they had impressive night fighting capabilities, just had deficiencies in sonar and radar compared to equivalents of other navies.[23] Moreover, Japanese Navy doctrine in relation to commerce defense was very bad.[24]

The size and effectiveness of the Allied submarine force increased greatly during the Pacific War. The U.S. increased production of mod submarines from 1942 onward. The efforts of Admiral Charles A. Lockwood were crucial for the rectification of the Mark xiv'due south issues (which were nevertheless not resolved until September 1943).[xvi] He also selected more ambitious submarine skippers. Signals intelligence broke the "maru code" in January 1943, afterwards a gaffe by U.S. Customs pre-war had caused Japan to change it.[25] American aircraft engaged in aerial minelaying in Operation Starvation. As a outcome of all of these developments, U.S. submarines inflicted devastating losses on Japanese merchant shipping in 1943 and 1944, and past January 1945 had effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant armada.[26]

Poor torpedoes claimed at least two U.S. submarines[27] out of 48 lost on patrol.[28]

Countering the Japanese offensive [edit]

Torpedoed Japanese destroyer Yamakaze photographed through the periscope of American submarine USSNautilus on 25 June 1942.

In a break with pre-war doctrine (which, like Japan's, had presumed a rush across the Pacific and a "decisive battle" between battleships),[29] with the London Naval Treaty, and with long-continuing U.S. defense of freedom of the seas, U.S. naval commanders in the Pacific were ordered by the U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to "execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan" on the afternoon of seven December 1941, half dozen hours afterward the Japanese attack.[30] This order authorized all U.S. submarines in the Pacific to attack and sink any warship, commercial vessel, or civilian rider ship flying the Japanese flag, without alarm. Thomas C. Hart, commander in primary, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, issued the same social club at 03:45 Manila time (09:fifteen in Hawaii, 14:45 in DC) on his own initiative (but knowing U.S. Navy Primary of Operations Harold "Betty" Stark intended to practise so).[31]

The Pacific Fleet submarine forcefulness had emerged unscathed from the attack on Pearl Harbor and USSGudgeon departed on the armada's first offensive war patrol on xi December. The Asiatic Fleet'due south 27 submarines (including more fleet boats than at Pearl Harbor)[32] as well went into action on the first day of U.S. involvement in the state of war, beginning war patrols in the waters effectually the Philippines and Indochina.[33] Due to inadequate prewar planning, which made no provision for defensive minelaying,[34] nor for placing submarines on station effectually the Philippines,[35] nor off enemy harbors,[36] the Asiatic Fleet's efforts to counter the Japanese invasion of the Philippines were unsuccessful and the fleet's surviving submarines were forced to withdraw to Surabaya in the Dutch Due east Indies (DEI).[37]

British, and U.S. submarines took part in the unsuccessful defense of British Malaya and the DEI in late 1941 and early 1942. In Dec 1941, five Dutch submarines attacked the Japanese invasion fleet off Malaya. These submarines sank ii Japanese merchant ships and damaged four others, but three of the attackers were sunk. The ii surviving Dutch submarines were withdrawn to defend the DEI where they were assisted past 2 British submarines, which had been transferred from the Mediterranean Fleet, and several U.S. boats.[38] The U.Due south. Asiatic Fleet'due south submarine forcefulness left Surabaya for Fremantle, Western Australia, on one March. (They would remain in Australia, on the most hazardous and unproductive stations for U.S. submarines, for the duration.)[32] Past this date, the Asiatic Armada'due south 27 submarines had sunk 12 Japanese ships for the loss of four U.S. boats.[39] Following the fall of the DEI, only a handful of British and Dutch submarines were based in the Indian Body of water, and these had little impact on Japanese forces in the expanse.[40]

War of attrition [edit]

Subsequently the Battle of the Coral Sea, the U.S. Navy discrete eight submarines to finish off the damaged aircraft carrier Shōkaku, but she evaded all of them. At the Battle of Midway, although the assail on the battleship Kirishima by USSNautilus had been unsuccessful, it drew the destroyer Arashi temporarily abroad from the master fleet to drop depth charges, and the destroyer'due south return was traced by USSEnterprise'due south VB-half-dozen to the Japanese task force, where the dive bombers promptly set on fire the fleet carriers Akagi and Kaga.[41] [42] [43] Overall in 1942, U.South. submarines had managed to sink the heavy cruiser Kako and the low-cal cruiser Tenryū.

As a result of several cardinal improvements the previous year, U.South. submarines inflicted tremendous losses to the heavy units of the Regal Japanese Navy in 1944. They destroyed the Japanese fleet carriers Shōkaku and Taihō in the Boxing of the Philippine Sea, and sank or disabled 3 Takao-form cruisers at the start of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Besides sunk that year were the battleship Kongō (existence the merely Japanese battleship lost to a submarine), the escort carriers Shin'yō, Taiyō and Un'yō, and the armada carriers Unryu and Shinano, the latter beingness the largest vessel ever sunk by a submarine.

From 1943, Centrolineal submarines waged an increasingly effective campaign against Japanese merchant shipping and the IJN. By the end of the war in August 1945, the Japanese merchant marine had less than a quarter of the tonnage it had in Dec 1941. Overall, U.S. Navy submarines sank effectually i,300 Japanese merchant ships, too every bit roughly 200 warships.[44] Despite the need to maintain sea lanes for its empire, the Japanese never successfully developed a cost-effective destroyer escort ameliorate suited for convoy duties, while it also did not have the industrial might to supplant the losses of its heavily armed destroyers,[45] [46] nor of its ill-protected merchantmen.

In 1943, U.S. Congressman Andrew J. May revealed the fact that Japanese depth charges were not set deep enough to destroy U.S. submarines. While it has never been definitively established that May's disclosure actually prompted the Japanese to augment their strategy.[47] Japanese anti-submarine warfare grew in effectiveness, particularly subsequently the debut of radar in the IJN.[ citation needed ]

British and Dutch submarine operations [edit]

The British submarine force in the Far Due east was greatly expanded from Baronial 1943 onward. The British Eastern Fleet was responsible for submarine operations in the Bay of Bengal, Strait of Malacca every bit far equally Singapore, and the western coast of Sumatra to the Equator. Few large Japanese cargo ships operated in this area, and the British submarines' main targets were small craft operating in inshore waters.[48] The submarines were deployed to conduct reconnaissance, interdict Japanese supplies travelling to Burma, and attack U-boats operating from Penang. The Eastern Armada'due south submarine force continued to expand during 1944, and past October 1944 had sunk a cruiser, iii submarines, six small naval vessels, 40,000 long tons (41,000 t) of merchant ships, and most 100 pocket-size vessels.[49]

The British submarine force expanded its areas of performance in the last months of the war. In late 1944, the 8th Flotilla—with eleven British and Dutch submarines—was transferred to Fremantle and operated in the Java Sea and surrounding areas under the command of the U.S 7th Fleet. The quaternary Flotilla and the newly formed second Flotilla remained at Ceylon.

Past March 1945, British boats had gained control of the Strait of Malacca, preventing any supplies from reaching the Japanese forces in Burma by bounding main. By this time, there were few large Japanese ships in the region, and the submarines mainly operated against small ships which they attacked with their deck guns.

In April the eighth Flotilla moved to Subic Bay in the Philippines and the 4th Flotilla replaced it at Fremantle. At this time, there were 38 British and Dutch submarines in the theater, and an additional five boats on their way from Europe. The submarine HMSTrenchant torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser Ashigara in the Bangka Strait, taking down some one,200 Japanese army troops.

Three British submarines were sunk by the Japanese during the war: HMSStratagem, HMSPorpoise, and HMSStonehenge (which was mined).[fifty]

Merchant shipping losses [edit]

Unlike sources provide varying figures for the size of the Japanese merchant marine and its wartime losses.

Size of the Japanese merchant armada during World War II (all figures in tons)[51]

Appointment Additions Losses Net modify End of menstruum
total 		Index
12/07/1941 6,384,000 100
12/1941 44,200 51,600 −seven,400 6,376,600 99
1942 661,800 one,095,800 −434,000 5,942,600 93
1943 1,067,100 two,065,700 −998,600 4,494,400 77
1944 ane,735,100 4,115,100 −2,380,000 2,564,000 40
i/45 – eight/45 465,000 one,562,100 −1,097,100 1,466,900 23

Japanese merchant fleet losses during World War II (all figures in tons, taken from JANAC)[52]

Appointment Starting tonnage Additions Losses Net change Terminate of period
total
1942 (including 12/41) 5,975,000 111,000 725,000 −89,000 5,886,000
1943 5,886,000 177,000 i,500,000 −1,323,000 4,963,000
1944 iv,963,000 624,000 ii,700,000 −2,076,000 two,887,000
1945 2,887,000 ? 415,000 −415,000 2,472,000
end of war -3,903,000 ane,983,000

One Japanese reference reports 15,518 civilian ships lost.[53] JANAC reports ii,117 Japanese merchant ships lost with a total tonnage of 7,913,858 long tons (viii,040,851 t) and 611 IJN ships lost with a total tonnage of ane,822,210 long tons (1,851,450 t).[54]

Attacks on IJA troopships and hell ships [edit]

In addition to taking a heavy toll on Nippon's merchant shipping, a large number of troopships were besides sunk. This resulted in the loss of thousands of Japanese troops, who were being transported to eternalize Japan'south already declining manpower on land in the final years of the war. Centrolineal submarines sank an estimated 44 Japanese troopships with greater than 1,000 casualties in 33 of them.[55] The threat of submarine attack seriously hampered the ability of the Japanese Army to move troops.

Centrolineal submarines also sank a number of hell ships, which were transporting Allied POWs and rōmusha slave labourers. It is estimated that ten,800 POWs died at ocean. Nearly of these deaths were the upshot of an Centrolineal submarine attack.[56] Donald L. Miller has estimated the loss of life amidst POWs was twice that, asserting "approximately 21,000 Allied POWs died at sea, about nineteen,000 of them killed by friendly fire."[57]

Other duties [edit]

Photo of Makin Isle taken from USS Nautilus during the raid on the isle in August 1942.

Allied submarines served in a range of other duties during the Pacific War. U.S. Navy submarines were often used for surveillance. This included taking photos of areas of interest (such as potential beaches for amphibious landings), and reporting on the movements of IJN warships. U.S. submarines landed and supplied reconnaissance and guerrilla forces and played a role in sustaining the guerrilla motion in the Philippines,[58] at the cost of their diversion from attacks on Japanese commerce.[59]

In belatedly 1944 and 1945 several submarines were fitted with a newly developed FM (frequency modulated) sonar that was intended for detection of submerged mines, kickoff Tinosa and Spadefish, and afterwards Flight Fish, Skate, Bonefish, Crevalle, and Sea Dog. Tinosa surveyed and mapped the minefields effectually Okinawa prior to the US invasion, and the boats of Operation Barney used the sonar to map and penetrate the minefields of La Perouse Strait prior to operating inside the Sea of Nippon.

They too occasionally transported commandos, such as Nautilus and Argonaut landing Marine Raiders for an bootless raid on Makin Atoll.[sixty]

From early on 1944 U.S. submarines were besides used to rescue the crews of shipping which had been forced downwardly over the ocean. By the end of the war, submarines had rescued 504 airmen (including George H. West. Bush, who later on became the 41st President of the United States).[61]

British and Dutch submarines also landed and supplied special forces troops, rescued airmen, and shelled shore installations on ix occasions.[62]

Uk also deployed a flotilla of midget submarines to the Far Due east which were used to conduct sabotage raids. The Fourteenth Flotilla, which was equipped with six XE-class submarines, arrived in Australia in April 1945 only was almost disbanded in May as no suitable targets could be found. The Flotilla's fortunes improved in early June, however, when undersea telegraph lines in the Southward China Ocean were identified as existence worthwhile targets forth with a heavy cruiser at Singapore.[63] On 31 July, XE4 cutting the submerged Singapore-Saigon telegraph cable almost Cape St. Jacques in French Indochina and XE5 cut the Hong Kong-Saigon cable shut to Lamma Island, Hong Kong.[64] At the aforementioned fourth dimension, XE1 and XE3 penetrated the Straits of Johor where they severely damaged the Japanese heavy cruiser Takao with limpet mines.[65]

Submarine captain Medal of Honor awards [edit]

  • Harder • Samuel D. Dealey
  • Sculpin • John P. Cromwell
  • Affront • Eugene B. Fluckey
  • Parche • Lawson P. Ramage
  • Tang • Richard O'Kane
  • Growler • Howard W. Gilmore
  • Tirante • George Fifty. Street

Mail service-state of war [edit]

Centrolineal actions in the Pacific are believed to have been a mitigating cistron in reducing the sentence of Großadmiral Karl Dönitz post-obit the Nuremberg Trials, who was accused of like actions in the Boxing of the Atlantic; indeed, Admiral Nimitz provided Dönitz with a argument maxim his boats behaved no differently.[66] The official judgment of the International Military Tribunal cited the statement every bit part of the reason Dönitz's sentence was "non assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international police force of submarine warfare."[67]

See besides [edit]

  • Hell ship
  • Imperial Japanese Regular army shipping artillery – Gun crews for Japanese troop transports and defensively equipped merchant ships
  • Japanese submarines in the Pacific War
  • Listing of ships sunk by submarines by decease toll
  • List of most successful American submarines in World State of war II
  • Listing of lost United states submarines
  • Operation Starvation
  • U.s.a. Submarine Operations in Earth War 2 by Theodore Roscoe

Notes [edit]

  1. ^ a b Euan Graham (2006). Nippon's sea lane security, 1940–2004: a affair of life and decease?. Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-35640-4.
  2. ^ Blair, Dirt, Jr. Silent Victory (Runted, 1947), pp.508, 521–2, 568, 574, 576, 609, 646, 724, 745–half-dozen, 784, 806, 818, 825, 827, 829, 842, 865–6, & 868–9.
  3. ^ Holwitt, Joel I. "Execute Confronting Japan", Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio Country University, 2005, pp.212–217 & 232–249 passim.
  4. ^ Holwitt, passim.
  5. ^ a b Holwitt, p.6.
  6. ^ Dönitz, Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Xx Days; von der Poorten, Edward P. The German Navy in World State of war Two (T. Y. Crowell, 1969); Milner, Marc. Due north Atlantic run: the Majestic Canadian Navy and the battle for the convoys (Vanwell Publishing, 2006)
  7. ^ Roscoe, Theodore. Pig Boats: The True Story of the Fighting Submariners of World War 2. pp. 29–48
  8. ^ https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550699.pdf . Retrieved 29 April 2021
  9. ^ Spector (1984), pp.480–483.
  10. ^ Morison (1949), p.188.
  11. ^ Lenton, H. T. American Submarines (Navies of the Second World War Series; New York: Doubleday, 1973), p.5 table.
  12. ^ Mars (1971), pg 27, 62 and 64.
  13. ^ Mars (1971), pg 212.
  14. ^ "Dutch submarines in Australian waters". Allies in Arduousness. Australia and the Dutch in the Pacific War. Australian War Memorial. 2006. Retrieved 2008-06-08 .
  15. ^ Parillo (1993), pg 37–38.
  16. ^ a b Blair, Silent Victory, p.439.
  17. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, pp.361, 553, & passim.
  18. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, p.156.
  19. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, pp.361 & 551.
  20. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, pp.509 et al..
  21. ^ Parillo.
  22. ^ Parillo (1993), pg 63–73.
  23. ^ Japanese Destroyers
  24. ^ Parillo; Peattie & Evans, Kaigun.
  25. ^ Blair; Farago, Cleaved Seal.
  26. ^ Blair, pp.819 & 967ff.
  27. ^ Tullibee to the Mk14, Tang to the Mk18, both from circular runs; given the prevalence of circulars, there were probably others. Blair, Silent Victory.
  28. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, pp.991–92.
  29. ^ Miller, Edward S. (1991). War Program Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, MD: United states of america Naval Found Printing.
  30. ^ Spector (1984), pp.478–479; Blair, Silent Victory, p.106; Holwitt, Joel I. "Execute Against Japan", Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2005.(page needed).
  31. ^ Holwitt, Joel I. "Execute Confronting Japan", Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2005, pp.212–217 passim.
  32. ^ a b Blair, Silent Victory.
  33. ^ Christley (2006), p.39.
  34. ^ Willmott, H. P. Barrier and the Javelin?
  35. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, pp.157–158.
  36. ^ Blair, Silent Victory, pp.156–eight.
  37. ^ Morison (1948), p.303.
  38. ^ Mars (1971), pp.211–213.
  39. ^ Morison (1948), pp.303–305.
  40. ^ Mars (1971), pp.214–215.
  41. ^ "IJN KIRISHIMA: Tabular Tape of Move". Senkan!. combinedfleet.com. 2006. Archived from the original on x June 2007. Retrieved 2007-06-06 .
  42. ^ Bicheno, Hugh. Midway (Sterling Publishing Visitor, 2001), p.134.
  43. ^ Lord, Incredible Victory p. 213; Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.302–303.
  44. ^ World War two Submarines
  45. ^ Long Lancers | Nihon Kaigun
  46. ^ Matsu-class Destroyer | Nippon Kaigun
  47. ^ Norman Friedman (1995). U.S. Submarines Through 1945. Naval Plant Press. p. 355. ISBN 1-55750-263-3.
  48. ^ Mars (1971), p.216.
  49. ^ McCartney (2006), pp.40–42.
  50. ^ McCartney (2006), pp.42–43.
  51. ^ Parillo (1993), pg 242.
  52. ^ Blair, pp.360, 552, 816, 878, 970, 975, 977, 979, 980, & 982.
  53. ^ Axis History Forum • View topic – Questions concerning the IJA merchant fleet
  54. ^ HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Aircraft Losses [Chapter ii]
  55. ^ Wrecksite List of Casualties - Japanese
  56. ^ Britain at war - Hell ships
  57. ^ "Donald L. Miller "D-Days in the Pacific", p. 317"
  58. ^ Adamson, Hans Christian. Guerrilla Submarines
  59. ^ Blair, p.357.
  60. ^ Blair, pp.308–9. This had unintended consequences, drawing Japanese attention to the weak defenses, which were strengthened when the U.S. invaded the atoll in November 1943.
  61. ^ Christley (2006), pp.42–44.
  62. ^ McCartney (2006), p.42.
  63. ^ Jones and Nunan (2005), pp.239–242.
  64. ^ McCartney (2006), p.43.
  65. ^ Mars (1971), p.225.
  66. ^ Dönitz, Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days.
  67. ^ Blair, passim;Judgement: Dönitz the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School.

References [edit]

  • Blair, Dirt (2001). Silent Victory: The U.South. Submarine War Against Nippon (reprint ed.). Annapolis: Naval Establish Printing. ISBN978-ane-55750-217-9.
  • Christley, Jim; Tony Bryan (2006-01-31). US Submarines 1941–45. Oxford: Ospery Publishing. ISBN978-1-84176-859-v.
  • Jones, David; Nunan, Peter (2005). U.Southward. Subs Downwards Under. Brisbane, 1942–1945. Annapolis: Naval Establish Press. ISBN978-i-59114-644-5.
  • Mars, Alastair (1971). British Submarines at War 1939–1945. London: William Kimber. ISBN0-7183-0202-8.
  • McCartney, Innes (2006-eleven-28). British Submarines 1939–45. Oxford: Ospery Publishing. ISBN978-ane-84603-007-nine.
  • Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001) [1948]. The Rising Sun in the Pacific. History of U.s.a. Naval Operations in World State of war II. Urbana: Academy of Illinois Press. ISBN978-0-252-06973-4.
  • Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001) [1949]. Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. ISBN978-0-252-06995-6.
  • Parillo, Marker P. (1993). The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis: Naval Institute Printing. ISBN978-1-55750-677-1.
  • Poirier, Michel Thomas (1999). "Results of the American Pacific Submarine Campaign of World War 2". Chief of Naval Operations Submarine Operations Division. Archived from the original on 2007-xi-09. Retrieved 2008-06-07 .
  • Spector, Ronald H. (2001-10-xi). Eagle Confronting the Sun. The American War with Japan. London: Cassel & Co. ISBN978-0-304-35979-0.
  • United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) (1946). "United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War)". Archived from the original on xvi May 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-07 .

Further reading [edit]

  • Joint Ground forces-Navy Assessment Committee (1947). "Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During Earth War Ii by All Causes". Hyperwar. Archived from the original on 17 February 2009. Retrieved 2009-03-15 .
  • "Submarine war patrol reports". Historical Naval Ships Association. Retrieved 2009-06-12 .

External links [edit]

  • Combined Fleet Website
  • In the Shadow of the Titanic: Merchant Ships Lost With Greater Fatalities by David L Williams

drexlerhurstoill.blogspot.com

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_submarines_in_the_Pacific_War

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